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THE ORGANIZATION AS WEAPON IN

WHITE-COLLAR CRIMEt
Stanton Wheeler*
Mitchell Lewis Rothman**

Edwin Sutherland originated the phrase "white-collar crime" in
his presidential address to the American Sociological Society in December 1939, 1 but scholarly consideration of the subject precedes
that date considerably. In 1907, while the muckrakers were publicizing corporate misbehavior for the masses, Edward Alsworth Ross
published academic sociology's first treatment of what we today label white-collar crime. His Sin and Society argued that a new crimi- ·
nal was at large, one ''who picks pockets with a railway rebate,
murders with an adulterant instead of a bludgeon, burglarize~ with a
'rake-off' instead of. a jimmy, cheats with a company prospectus instead of a deck of cards, or scuttles his town instead of his ship2-in
short, one whose crimes were committed on behalf, or with the
assistance, of a business corporation.
Like Ross, Sutherland wrote primarily of corporate illegality; his
study of offenses committed by seventy of the nation's industrial
leaders, presented at length in White Collar Crime,3 informed all his
work.4 Sutherland's most widely accepted definition of white-collar

t With compliments for unwittingly suggesting the title: Philip Selznick "(The
Organizational Weapon) and Frank Zimring ("The Medium Is the Message: Firearm Caliber
as a Determinant of the Death Rate From Assault") 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 97 (1972). This work is
supported by Grant #78-NI-AX-0017 from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department
of Justice. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the Department of Justice. We are
extremely indebted to two principal collaborators on the white-collar crime project, Nancy
Bode and David Weisburd, who were responsible for much of the original data collection and
analysis. We would also like to thank Jack Katz, Reinier Kraakman, WoQdy Powell, and
Albert J. Reiss, Jr. for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
* Professor of Law and Sociology, Yale University. B.A. 1952, Pomona College; M.A.
1956, Ph.D. 1958, University of Washington.
** B.A. 1969, Queens College; J.D. 1974, Ph.D. 1982, Yale University. Assistant Professor of Law, Hamline University.
1. Published the following year as Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality. 5 AM. Soc. REv.
1 (1940). Sutherland had used the phrase ''white-collar criminaloids" in the second and third
editions of his text, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (1934, 1939).
2. E. Ross, SIN AND SOCIETY ~ (1907).
3. E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1949).
4. See Crime of Corporations, in THE SUTHERLAND PAPERS 78-96 (A. Cohen, A,
Lindesmith & K. Schuessler eds. 1956); The White-Collar Criminal, in Encyclopedia of Criminology 511-15 (V. Branham & S. Kutash eds. 1949); Is "White-Collar Crime" Crime?, 10 AM.
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crime, however, said nothing at all regarding corporate or organizational conduct. Instead, it spoke of status and occupation, grafting
new themes to sociology's traditional concern for corporate excess:
"White-collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the
course of his occupation."5
Though important, the link between social status and white-collar crime is not immediately relevant. What is significant is how deference to a requirement that the white-collar criminal act "in the
course of his occupation" and the notion that white-collar crime is
inherently organizational have been sources of ambiguity and confusion in the literature since Sutherland's death. Two influential
works, Clinard's6 and Hartung's7 research on black market activities
during World War II, are revealing in this regard. Both studied the
crimes of businesspeople, Both suggested that white-collar crime referred only to such conduct. But for Clinard, white-collar crime
meant only "illegal activities among business and professional
men," 8 while Hartung viewed it as "a violation of law regulating
business, which is committed for a firm by the firm or its agents in
the conduct of its business."9
This tension between one view of white-collar crime focusing on
occupation and another emphasizing organization was not soon resolved. During the 1960s and early 1970s, researchers either viewed
occupational and organizational illegality as distinct forms of criminal behavior, or described corporate offenses as a subset of occupational illegality. Reflecting the first point of view, for example, a
leading text presented separate chapters on occupational and corporate offenses. Occupational crimes, it stated, include those "committed by individuals for the~selves in the course of their occupations
and the offenses of employees aga~st employers"; corporate offenses
were those "committed by corporate officials for their corporation
and the offenses of the corporation itself." 10 But these were distinctions without a difference. How is one to determine when crimes are
committed "for the corporation" or by "the corporation itself'? InSoc. REV. 132 (1945); White-Collar Criminality, supra note l; Crime and Business, 217 ANNALS
112 (1941).
5. E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, at 9 (footnote omitted).
6. See M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET (1952); Clinard, Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime Regulations, ll AM. Soc. REv. 258 (1946).
7. Hartung, White-Collar Offenses in tire Wholesale Meat Industry in ./Jelroit, 56 AM. J. Soc.
25 (1950).
8. M. CLINARD, supra note 6, at viii.
9. Hartung, supra note 7, at 25 (footnote omitted).
10. M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS 188 (2d ed, 1973).

June 1982]

Organization as Weapon

1405

eluding organizational offenses within a larger category called occupational crime, as some writers have done, does not make the line
between the two any easier to draw. I I
Previous work has tried to distinguish individual and organizational illegality in two ways. One approach focuses on benefit:
Either the individual gains at the organization's expense, as in embezzlement, or the organization profits regardless of individual advantage, as in price fixing. 12 But individuals and their organizations
often reap mutual advantage from criminal conduct. What happens,
for example, when white-collar crimes are committed by the principals of small business firms? In such instances, it may be misleading
to speak of separate individual and organizational identities; motive
may reflect individual as well as organizational interests.
The second approach asks whether criminal behavior furthers organizational goals. I 3 Again, we run into difficulties. Stated objectives may not correspond to organizational reality, and groups
within a firm may favor widely divergent aims. In an analysis developed for other purposes, Enµann and Lundman have suggested that
information concerning organizational norms, socialization patterns
within the enterprise, and executive knowledge of subordinates' activities are all required before wrongdoing can be classified as individual or organizational. I 4 It is often difficult, of course, to obtain
such data.
The recent explosion of interest in white-collar illegality has not
greatly changed matters. Scholars have concentrated on corporate
crime and given less attention to illicit occupational behavior, but it
is still not clear whether research refers specifically to organizational
or occupational offenses or to some combination of these phenomena. That the two categories might overlap is often ignored; after all,
those who act on behalf of an organization generally do so in an
occupational role. On the other hand, occupation inplies employment and in our society most employment occurs within an organization. Unfortunately, no one has specified what difference it makes
I I. See Clarke, White-Collar Crime, Occupational Crime, and Legitimacy, 6 INTL. J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 121 (1978); Hornung, Blue-Collar Theft: Conceptions ofProperty, Attitudes Toward Pilfering, and Work Group Norms in a Modem Industrial Plant, in CRIMES
AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 46, 47 (E. Smigel & H. Ross eds. 1970).
12. H. BLOCH & G. GEIS, MAN, CRIME, AND SOCIETY (1962); M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY,
supra note 10, and Hartung, supra note 7, have all employed this distinction.
13. See Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PROBS.
407 (1978); Shapiro, Thinking About White-Collar Crime: Matters of Conceptualization and Research, in REsEARCH ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice) 1980.
14. Ermann & Lundman, JJeviant Acts by Complex Organizations: JJeviance and Social
Control at the Organizational Level ofAm:lysis, 19 Soc. Q. 55 (1978).
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when a crime is committed under the cover of an organization or in
some occupational context. And social scientists and legal scholars
have referred only to the largest, for-profit corporations in describing
- and decrying - the consequences of organizational wrongdoing.
This Article explores the advantages of using organization or occupation in the more typical case. Our inquiry takes this as its central question: What difference does it make when a white-collar
crime is committed in the course of one's occupation or when acting
on behalf, or with the assistance, of an organization? If we are becoming, as some have argued, an organizational society, 15 then we
should see the results of this change reflected in illicit as well as licit
behavior. The organizational form may be used for either social or
antisocial ends. Our principal hypothesis, as the title suggests, is that
the organization, size and profitability notwithstanding, is for whitecollar criminals what the gun or knife is for the common criminal a tool to obtain money from victims. 16

I.

DESIGN OF THE INQUIRY

Our work was part of a broader program of research on whitecollar illegality. 17 Specifically, our data were drawn from a study
assessing differentials in the sentencing of white-collar offenders,
which had collected presentence investigation reports (PSis) for persons convicted during fiscal years 1976, 1977, and 1978 of eight presumptively white-collar crimes prosecuted in the federal courts:
15. Our society is an organizational society. We are born in organizations, educated by
organizations, and most of us spend much of our lives working for organizations. We
spend much of our leisure time paying, playing, and praying in organizations. Most of us
will die in an organization, and when the time comes for burial, the largest organization of
all-the state - must grant official permission.
A. ETZIONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS I (1964) (footnote omitted). The phrase itself is drawn
from the larger discussion in R. PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY (1962).
For Perrow, the word "organization" no longer qualifies "society" - organizations are
society. In our "society of organizations," the organization is "the only game in town," the
locus of "almost all human needs, including the numerous ones it has managed to create."
Today, virtually all that is human is created in or defined in terms of its association with
organizations. Organization Theory in a Society of Organizations (1979) (paper delivered at
the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston).
16. The organizational advantage should obtain when not-for-profits step over the line,
too. But our data so infrequently include the activity of not-for-profit organizations that we
are loathe to generalize about such conduct. Nevertheless, we use both "corporate" and "organizational" (and related forms of these words) throughout to connote phenomena more universal than those occurring only in for-profit, commercial contexts.
17. Books published so far in this program include W.M. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES (1979),
ands. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978). Another
six studies will be forthcoming from Yale University Press as they reach completion. They will
include monographs on self-dealing in the corporation, detection of illegalities by the SEC,
federal prosecution of white-collar crime, legal defense of white-collar defendants, and two
studies of sentencing of white-collar offenders.
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antitrust violations, securities fraud, postal and wire fraud, false
claims and statements, credit and lending institution fraud, bank embezzlement, tax evasion, and bribery. This sentencing project had
studied as many as thirty cases per offense in each of seven federal
districts 18 for six of the categories of crimes, and a national sample of
antitrust and securities cases.
Prepared by federal probation officers, the PSI is the basic document used by the court at sentencing. 19 For cases that have not gone
to trial (eighty-two percent of those in our sample), the PSI is often
the only source of information regarding offense and offender available to the judge. That presentence reports are completed for only a
few of those who actually commit illegal acts is, of course, significant. Criminal activity not discovered or reported to authorities was
not in the sentencing project's sample.. Neither was conduct that did
not result in indictment or, eventually, a finding of guilt. The cases
examined were thus not representative of even the eight federal
crimes under scrutiny.2° Consider, for example, the effect of
prosecutorial decisions on case selection. It has been suggested the
results reported below in part reflect features of the enforcement process; organizational crimes, it is said, are difficult to prove, and prosecutors make the unusual investigative effort required to document
organizational illegality only when wrongdoing is prominent
enough, in terms of structure, duration, victimization, and the like, to
warrant massive investment of time and other resources. Less consequential misbehavior simply isn't "worth it." We disagree with that
argument, and shall return to the issue after presenting our own :findings, but we do think it worth keeping such possibilities in mind as
the data are reviewed.
Because it provides descriptions of the nature of the crime and
the context in which it was carried out, the PSI permitted the identification of offenses committed by individuals, those committed by
individuals who used an occupational role or position, and those accomplished through some form of organization. Our defendants fell
18. The districts (and their central cities) include Central California (Los Angeles), Northern Georgia (Atlanta), Northern Illinois (Chicago), Maryland, Southern New York (Manhattan and the Bronx), Northern Texas (Dallas), and Western Washington (Seattle).
19. Rule 32(c)(l) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a presentence investigation report to be made out on all convicted offenders prior to sentence unless, with the
court's permission, the defendant waives the report, or the court finds sufficient information in
the record to sentence the offender. Approximately six percent of our potential sample cases
had no PSI. As a condition of receiving these confidential documents, we agreed with probation authorities to establish procedures to insure confidentiality of personal information.
20. Much less behavior was prosecuted in other statutory categories or in state courts.
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into the six categories shown in table 1.21
Table 1
A Jy_pology of White-Collar Offenders
Use of an Occupational
Offense
Role or Position
committed by:
NO
YES
Cell I
Cell 4
A Single Individual
Cell 5
Cell 2
A Group of Affiliated Individuals
Cell 6
Cell 3
Through Use of a Formal Organization

The presentence reports were completed for individual defendants.22 Though we refer throughout to occupational and organizational crimes, it is perhaps more accurate to say that we are really
concerned with the benefits accruing to individuals as a result of the
use of occupation and organization. We have already indicated that
differentiating between individual, occupational, and organizational
offenses is not an easy conceptual matter. It is often not possible to
separate individual and organizational gain neatly, or to distinguish
the influence of occupational role and organization on criminal activity when persons are operating in complex social environments,
and we make no attempt to do so here.
,
After a preliminary examination of the data, we made two
changes in order to simplify the presentation here. First, we collapsed the distinction between individuals operating alone (cell 1)
and individuals acting with affiliated persons (cell 2). As we anticipated, on most items the category of "affiliated individuals" falls between lone defendants on the one hand, and those using an
organizational position on the other. But since there is not much
difference between "affiliated individuals" and lone offenders, and
21. Two items from our coding scheme were used to establish the three fold typology described below. One item asked: "Which of the following comes closest to describing the level
of organization of the actual offense?" The three relevant categories turned on whether the
offense was committed by a single individual, by two or more affiliated persons, or "through an
organized association, business organization, partnership or family business." The second category indicated use of the combined personal resources of several individuals working in an
informal group; the third marked the defendant's mobilization of the resources of a formal
organization. The second item used to construct the typology asked: "What role did the defendant's occupational situation play in the offense?" Although the coding scheme allowed for
a variety of modes of use, we distinguished simply between those in which the defendant's
occupational situation played no role and those in which it played some part - permitting
access to documents or information, the use of a position of authority or business identity to
victimize others, and the like.
22. Because it was particularly interested in the decision to incarcerate, the sentencing program did not focus specifically on indicted organizations. In fact, with the exception of antitrust, where corporations are routinely named, organizational indictments occur only
infrequently in these statutory categories.
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the number of cases in the affiliated category was about half the
other, we saw no reason to separate rigorously the two in this paper.
The second major simplification pertains to cell 3: individuals
who use organization, but not occupation. This Article will not discuss these cases. This cell was by far the smallest, comprising less
than four percent of the sample. We considered joining these cases
with cell 6, or with the now united cells 1 and 2, but after inspecting
the cases decided not to, for they seemed to fall into distinct types
and did not allow for easy combination.23
We have, then, three principal categories of offenders: those who
committed offenses alone or with affiliated others using neither occupational nor organizational role (individual offenders); those who
committed offenses alone or with affiliated others using an occupational role (occupational offenders); and those who committed offenses in which both organization and occupation were ingredients
(organizational offenders).24 Note again that we did not distinguish
occupational and organizational crimes. Rather, we considered occupation and organization as attributes that may - or may not appear in a given instance. Note, too, that our organizational crimes
need not be the result of corporate misadventure (though most of the
organizational illegality reported below was committed by, or on behalf of, for-profit business organizations). We expected that crimes
committed within an occupational role would differ from crimes that
were not, and that crimes committed with ·the assistance of both occupation and organization would be different still. By drawing on
data collected by the sentencing project regarding the nature, consequences, and processing of white-collar illegality, and the personal
and social characteristics of convicted white-collar felons, we hope to
demonstrate how such differences are manifested.
·
23. Nearly one half of these cases represented instances of tax evasion, where either an
employer failed to remit taxes withheld from workers' paychecks, or self-employed persons did
not report business income on their personal returns. The second largest category in the cell
included cases of fraud where defendants operated in shell or other alleged corporations.
24. The face validity of this measure - how well it reflects distinctive occupational and
organizational qualities -is suggested by its relation to two other indicators oflevel of organization used in our study. We asked whether an offense occurred once, on a number of separate
occasions, on separate occasions, but as part of one overarching plan, or whether it had one
cumulative effect. As expected, this variable is strongly related to organizational type: Of the
offenses occurring only once or on a number of separate occasions, about one half were individual offenses (compared to 36% for the total sample). Of those that involved an overarching
plan or added up to one cumulative effect, about one half were committed through an organization, compared to 35% for the total sample. Similarly, we coded the data to determine
whether an offense involved one level of organization, two levels of organization, or three or
more levels. Seventy-seven percent of the individual or affiliated individual cases involved one
level only, in contrast to less than 25% of those where both occupational and organizational
roles were present

Michigan Law Review

1410

[Vol. 80:1403

One final methodological note before we present our results. By
combining defendants convicted of different statutory offenses, we
necessarily neglected features that were offense-specific. Within our
sample, for example, most bank embezzlers were individual offenders using an occupational position, and most tax offenders were indi. viduals who had neither occupational nor organizational "cover."
At the same time, both an organizational and occupational role were
involved in all the antitrust cases and most of the SEC cases. Thus,
we might attribute to the "organizational" dimension something that
is specific only to a particular offense such as SEC fraud or antitrust,
to the "occupational" dimension something specific to embezzlement, and to the "individual" offenses something peculiar to tax
fraud. To minimize this potential for distortion, we examined the
relationships reported below both for the total sample, and for the
four offenses - mail fraud, bribery, credit and lending institution
fraud, and false claims and statements - that were spread fairly
evenly across our three offender categories.25 We found that the relationships discovered in the full sample were virtually the same in
direction, though somewhat smaller in magnitude (typically about
half as strong), in the four-offense subset. We feel confident, therefore, that we are describing genuine effects of organizational and occupational role and not traits uniquely explained by a particular type
of offense. In what follows, we will present results for the total sample, and will add necessary detail with regard to the subset if it appears that not doing so would distort the true picture.
II.
A.

RESULTS

The Nature of the Illegality

We explored the nature of illegal behavior in our sample by using two different kinds of indicator: The first are "ecological" measures describing the frequency, duration, and geographic spread of
the offense. As the top portion of Table 2 shows, occupational and
organizational offenders break the law more often before they are
caught than do individual offenders. The differences are even
clearer for our subset of four offenses.26
25. Each of these offenses has at least one fifth, and no more than one third, of its cases in
each of the three categories.
26. Measurement of the number of acts may understate actual differences. For example,
one price-fixing scheme was counted as a single act, even though dozens of overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy might have occurred, or thousands of transactions with consumers
taken place as a result. Similarly, a mail fraud scheme in which fifty orders were sent out in
two mailings was coded as two acts, rather than one hundred. Recording numbers of discrete
acts must to some extent remain problematic when offenses, themselves so different, can be
conceptualized in various ways.
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Table 2
Number ef Times the Illegality was Completed
All Offenses

Number of Cases Mean Number of Times
I.
II.
III.
The
I.
II.
III.

Individual Offenders
Occupational Offenders
Organizational Offenders
Subset of Four Offenses
Individual Offenders
Occupational Offenders
Organizational Offenders

7.4

396
273
334

11.9
12.2

234
110
107

9.1
15.2
18.6

With respect to the duration of the offense (the length of time
between the first act and the last), however, Table 3 reveals a substantial difference when we contrast the total sample with the more
restricted set of four; results in the full complement of eight reflected
the extreme length of most antitrust and SEC offenses (approximately five and three years, respectively). The longer duration for
individual offenders and the shorter one for occupational criminals
in the full sample are largely explained by the relatively prolonged
nature of tax fraud, an individual crime, and by the comparative
brevity of embezzlement, which is occupational. But the general
pattern is very clear: Offenses committed in an organization's name
occurred more frequently, and over a longer period of time, than
those where an organizational element was lacking.
Table 3
.Duration ef the Offense
All Offenses

Number of Cases
I. Individual Offenders
II. Occupational Offenders
III. Organizational Offenders
The Subset of Four Offenses
I. Individual Offenders
IL Occupational Offenders
III. Organizational Offenders

Mean Duration (in months)

424
317
398

22.0
16.6
35.7

259
122
140

14.8
18.3
26.7

A similar picture emerges when we examine geographic spread.
As Table 4 indicates, individual or occupational delicts are rarely
felt outside the local area. Corporate offenses, however, are very
likely to have effects spread far and wide. Individual and occupa-

Michigan Law Review

1412

[Vol. 80:1403

tional defendants may be distinguished at lower levels; those who
use an occupational identity are more likely to affect at least a local
area, not just immediate participants.
Table 4
The Geographic Spread of the Offense
Individual Occupational Organizational
Offenders
Offenders
Offenders
Total
317
(73.7%)

. 174
(52.1%)

96
(24.9%)

587

76
(17.7%)

131
(39.2%)

75
(19.4%)

282

State or Regional

13

National or International

11
(3.3%)
18
(5.4%)

92
(23.8%)
123
(31.9%)

116

(3.0%)
24
(5.6%)

Total

430

334

386

I 150

Immediate Participants
Only
Local

165

The second group of indicators used to analyze the sample was
more qualitative in nature. Three measures were employed to assess
the complexity and sophistication of the crime.. The first asked
whether documents were created or manipulated during the offense
to substantiate a false statement. Such activity is clearly linked to
offense type: this occurred in a third of the individual cases, just
over half of the occupational cases, and seventy percent of the
organizational crimes. A pattern is less evident when the frequency
of a "cover up" is examined. 27 Fewer than one fifth of the solo offenders tried to hide what they had done; thirty percent of both the
occupational and organizational defendants did so. Finally, the sentencing project's coders rated offense sophistication directly (if impressionistically). A one to four scale reflected whether illegal
conduct was very, somewhat, not very, or not at all sophisticated.
The mean rating for organizational wrongs was 1.9; for occupational
crimes, 2.6; and for those conducted by lone men and women, 3.0.
The various indicators thus yield a relatively clear picture. While
crimes committed in an occupational capacity are "larger'' in some
sense than those conducted outside such roles, the most dramatic effects are realized when occupational and organizational identities
combine. This is quite consistent with other findings in our general
research program which emphasize the ability to "hide" an offense
within the interstices of organization and through elusive manipula27. The presence of cover-up activity was ascertained by asking, "Did the defendant employ methods to avoid or delay discovery of a previously committed illegality?"
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tion of paper, making it easier for relatively sophisticated crimes to
continue undetected for a longer period and to occur with greater
frequency. 28

B. The Economic and Social Consequences of Illegality
The above results suggest patterned differences in the nature of
the offenses undertaken by our three types of offender. We cannot,
however, conclude from that evidence that the consequences of such
acts are sharply different. For that we need evidence on the magnitude of the offense. In the course of our inquiry, we gathered from
the PSI as much data as we could concerning the actual magnitude
of the illegality in question - the "take," as measured in dollars.
That information was often missing, particularly when, as in the
more complicated mail and stock frauds and antitrust cases, the
large number of victims made it very difficult to estimate total loss.
The available data may, therefore, be biased in the direction oflesser
amounts because we did not have full reporting in all instances.
That the amount of loss is typically reported by either victims or
governmental officials may compensate; both may have an interest in
exaggerating offense magnitude. In any event, we regard the data
presented below as crude, but think they are clearly adequate to
show the main direction of the effect of organization, if not the
precise degree of that effect.29
Because we believe the results are both interesting and important,
and because we think different modes of presentation might lead to
different conclusions, we present in Table 5 data for all of the surveyed offenses, as well as for the subset of four crimes. We also report separately the arithmetic mean, which heightens the significance
of the very largest wrongs, and the median, ·or the case that lies precisely in the middle of the offense distribution. Indeed, because the
means are so heavily skewed, we think that the medians convey the
results most clearly. We also think it prudent to focus on the subset
of four offenses, thus removing the particular effects of tax, bank embezzlement, SEC fraud, and antitrust cases. This leaves cases more
evenly distributed across the four remaining crime categories.
28. See Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and
Common Crimes, 13 LAW & Soc. REV. 431 (1979) (the complexity of white-collar crimes forces
prosecutors to take more active roles in the investigation process).
29. Even where the data were available, the coding was not unambiguous. With bribery,
for example, we coded the amount of the bribe or kickback, not the more speculative amount
of the profit that might be gained as a result of the bribe. In income tax cases we coded the
amount owed the IRS. For lending and credit institution frauds we coded the amount ofloans
applied for. For unsuccessful offenses (a very small portion of the total) we coded the amount
that would have been taken had the crime been successful.
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Table 5
Offense Magnitude
All Offenses

I.
II.
III.
The
I.
II.
III.

Individual Offenders
Occupational Offenders
Organizational Offenders

Number of Cases

Median Take

Mean Take

316
269
221

$7,623
$8,018
$387,274

$74,585
$135,01 I
$1,077,432

206
92
96

$5,279
$17,106
$117,392

$73,616
$218,351
$612,305

Subset ofFour Offenses

Individual Offenders
Occupational Offenders
Organizational Offenders

Using either measure and in either sample, the results are stark
and unmistakable. To begin, the median take for individual offenders in our subset of four offenses was a little over $5,000. Those operating within the context of an occupational role netted
approximately three times as much-a bit over $17,000. If offenders
used both occupation and organization to commit their offense, the
take was about twenty times that in cases where they operated without such assistance. The corresponding median for all offenders was
higher for individuals, reflecting primarily the addition of tax frauds
(whose median was $21,668); for occupational offenders it was only
half as much as the median for the subset of four offenses (reflecting
the addition of bank embezzlers, whose median take was but $3,410.)
The median for organizational offenders, which was nearly three and
a half times the median in the subset of four, resulted from the addition to the sample of complex SEC frauds and the very few antitrust
offenses where dollar magnitude data were available.
The mean take for individual crimes in our four offense subset
was almost $75,000, or about four times the median magnitude. The
distribution was extremely skewed; a small number of cases involved
gargantuan amounts. Jo
The mean value of a crime committed organizationally exceeded
a million dollars. This contrasts with a little over half that much
($612,305) for our subset of four. As with the median, this di.fference
largely reflects the presence of the SEC cases. The median take for
persons convicted of SEC fraud was almost half a million dollars
($492,601). Twenty percent of these cases were in the $2.5 million
30. The largest category in our magnitude coding system was $2.5 million and over. We
do not know the distribution of the cases in this sub-category. In calculating mean take, we
used $3 million as a conservative el!timate for all such cases. Average magnitude in that category is probably somewhat larger. And this effect is present, of course, primarily for organizational offenses. Thus, we again feel the very large gap between the organizational and
individual defendants probably understates the actual difference.
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and above category. And while data were available on only fourteen
percent of antitrust violations surveyed, twelve of those six.teen cases
were in the $2.5 million-plus category, and the other four were worth
over half a million dollars.
These data, though crude, point to the enormous advantage accruing to those who use formal organization. But the results might
be due to other variables that are correlated with the organizational
dimension. Can anything be said regarding the effect of organization on offense magnitude when other, arguably relevant, factors are
held constant? We employed ordinary least squares regression to
address the problem from this perspective.
We first considered variables that measured offense-specific characteristics, such as statutory category, frequency and duration, geographic spread, complexity, sophistication, and the defendant's use
of an occupational role. Our attention next turned to offender traits,
including the defendant's age, sex, race, level of education, arrest
record, position within employing organization (whether or not such
position was used to further the crime, or the organization was involved in illegal activity), occupational status, and "impeccability"
or general community standing.31 A ''best" model, reflecting attributes of both offense and offender - one which most accurately predicted offense size on the basis of such information - was estimated
in this fashion.
Of the variables describing offense characteristics, duration, geographic spread, complexity, and sophistication were consistently significant at the very low alpha levels (p=.0001); a group of dummy
variables representing crime categories were also statistically significant. The frequency of illegal acts and the defendant's use of an
occupational position, however, were not. Of the offender traits, age,
race, education, and prior record were found unimportant, but sex
did prove a significant predictor of offense magnitude. This is perhaps misleading, given our sample; a large number of our female
defendants were relatively lowly placed bank tellers convicted of embezzlement.32 Sex was therefore an offense-specific measure of sta31. For the occupational prestige ratings, see Duncan, A Socio-Economic Indexfar All Occupations, in OCCUPATIONS & Soc. STATUS 109 (A. Reiss, Jr. ed. 1961). "Impeccability" was a
composite of 29 background variables generally included in the presentence reports. These
described early family life, academic performance, military and employment history, present
living arrangements, religious attendance, group affiliations, involvement with drugs and alcohol, and community reputation.
32. 15.6% of the sample's defendants were women; nearly half of these women (47.6%)
were convicted of bank embezzlement, and only one of those held a position higher than teller
or clerk. Ninety percent of all female defendants held nonmanagement jobs of that general
rank.
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Table 6
Predictors of Offense Magnitude
Regression Coefficients and
Independent Variables Standard Errorsa-Model I
Duration of Crime
Geographic Spread
Complexity
Sophistication
Defendant's Sex
Position in Firm
Crime Categories:
Embezzlement
Tax
Credit Fraud
False Statements
SEC Fraud
Bribery
Antitrust
Organization
R2
Intercept
n

Regression Coefficients and
Standard Errors-Model II

.352
.402
.938
-.564
-.489
.396

(.041)***
(.093)***
(.130)***
(.106)***
(.229)*
(.098)***

.346
.380
.871
-.531
-.483
.349

(.041)***
(.093)***
(.134)***
(.107)***
(.228)*
(.101)***

-.227
.125
.585
-.920
.738
-1.834
2.330

(.285)
(.319)
(.315)
(.334)**
(.333)*
(.424)***
(.547)***

-.215
.188
.583
-.971
.617
-1.844
2.108
.472
.635
4.462

(.285)
(.320)
(,314)
(.334)**
(.337)
(.422)***
(.557)***
(.238)*

.632
4.430
521

521

a: Standard errors shown parenthetically
•: p .05 ••: p .01 ***: p .001

tus as much as an indicator of valid gender-related differences in
criminal activity.
Position in firm was the most important of the more obvious
measures of social standing; one's company rank was always highly
significant, whether or not occupational prestige or impeccability
were also included in the model being tested. Prestige and impeccability were significant when each was alone in the equation, insignificant when position in firm was also present.
The best model in hand, a dummy variable reflecting whether the
crime in question had been conducted through or with the assistance
of a formal organization was added to this already-developed equation - to see if the fact of organization made any difference in offense magnitude, once other significantly related factors had been
taken into account. Table 6 shows what happened: without disturbing the significance of factors already identified as material
predictors of offense size, organization was also found statistically
significant. The result lends considerable support to the conclusion
we drew from Table 5 - the organization contributes in a very important way to the profits of white-collar crime. 33
33. The organization variable was also added to equations in which occupational status
and impeccability replaced position in firm. In the first instance, organization was significant
at the p=.003 level; in the second, at p=.0002.
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A similar analysis was undertaken for our subset of four offenses.
Though the results were largely the same, certain problems cloud
interpretation. The defendant's use of an occupational role to effect
or facilitate criminal activity was statistically significant; sex no
longer was. While the variables describing the defendant's status
were, in general, much less important, variation across judicial districts was now significant. 34 Unfortunately, organization and the use
of occupational role were too closely correlated in this subsample for
us to weigh accurately the separate effects of each on offense magnitude. There are simply too many cases in which both organization
and occupation are used for the regression technique to distinguish
their respective contributions. When organization and occupation
are introduced independently into a "core" model containing duration, geographic spread, complexity, and sophistication, they are
both statistically significant.35 When they appear together, only occupation is significant at the traditional p=.05 level (organization is
significant at p=.08) - but given the nature of the cases we are studying, this statistical result cannot be taken to suggest substantive importance or the lack of same.
Why the organizational edge? Organizations, of course, operate
on a grander scale than mere individuals. This difference can be
illustrated most clearly by an example. In one case, an individual
applied to the same bank for both a personal an4 business loan, offering phony personal tax returns as proof of his financial standing.
The personal loan was for $10,000; the corporate loan was for
$150,000. Neither was repaid.
A second loan case points to the same conclusion. Represented
by its president, a corporation entered into a fact<;>ring agreement
with a leading New York commercial bank, presenting it with $1.2
million in false billings over the course of seven months; the company's statements were either inflated to reflect much more business
than was actually being done, or were simply made up. Would the
bank have done this for an individual? Whether we conclude that
organizations are trusted more than individuals, or that they simply
operate on a much larger scale, it is clear that the havoc caused when
organizations are used36 outside the law far exceeds anything pro34. The effect of inter-district variation did not figure importantly in the larger sample in
part because of the close relationship between crime category and judicial district.
35. Organization at p=.0002, occupation at p=.0001.
36. In the two cases just cited, as in most of our "organizational" offenses, crimes are not
really committed by organizations, but are instead wrongs committed by individuals who use
an organization as a base for illegal activity.
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duced by unaffiliated actors.
Magnitude of monetary loss is only one measure of consequence.
An examination of the targets of white-collar crime provides another. Was the victim an organization, such as the bank in an embezzlement case or the government in a tax fraud? Or has some
combination of organizations and individuals, or only individuals,
been injured? When "real people" are hurt, trial judges often feel
that a more serious violation has occurred. 37 It is therefore worth
examining the targets chosen by our three types of offenders. We do
that in Table 7.
Table 7
'Iype of Victim
Individual Occupational Organizational
Total
Offenders
Offenders
Offenders
Only Organizations

390
(95.1%)

280
(87.8%)

191
(50.9%)

861

20

Organizations and Individuals,
Only Individuals

39
(12.2%)

184
(49.1%)

243

(4.9%)

Total

410

319

371

1104

Perhaps the first finding we should recognize is that most victims
of white-collar crime are organizations (including that largest of all
organizations, the federal government). Just as the organizational
form allows the commission of larger offenses, so organizations have
more resources to be stolen, and in that sense are more appropriate
targets for large-scale economic crime. It has also been suggested
that organizations may be less able to defend themselves against
criminal predation, again increasing the likelihood that they will be
victimized. 38 Beyond this the nature of the target of white-collar
crime is sharply related to the type of offender. If the offender is an
individual, or an individual working through an occupational role,
the victim is almost certain to be an organization. As Table 6 shows,
ninety-five percent of 410 individual offenders acted against organizational victims, as did eighty-eight percent of those using occupation in the commission of their crime. Individuals (as well as
aggregations of organizations and individuals) are most often victim37. For further detail on the study, see Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the While•
Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 4 (1980). This conclusion is drawn from an interview
study of the perspectives of federal court judges on the sentencing of white-collar versus common crime defendants.
38. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 8. On organizations as victims generally, see Reiss, Forward:
Towards a Revitalization ofTheory and Research on Victimization by Crime, 72 J. CRIM. L. AND
CRIMINOLOGY 704 (1981).
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ized by organizational offenders. A land fraud where individual victims lose their savings by investing in worthless property is a good
ex:ample. Thus, not only are organizational offenders more likely to
have committed much larger crimes in a monetary sense, they are
also more likely to have victimized individuals, who are presumptively less able to recover from losses sustained.
That organizational crimes are regarded as more serious is supported by two further pieces of evidence. The first concerns the maximum "exposure time" that our convicted felons could have served
for their offenses. This measure reflects in part the number of counts
for which defendants were separately charged, as well as the maximum penalties that Congress has established for each offense. The
maximum exposure time for individual defendants averaged four
years and three months. For occupational and organizational defendants, the average was five years, two months and five years,
three months, respectively. When we looked at our subset of four
crimes to remove some of the offense-specific effects, the mean exposure time was five years, two months for individuals, six years and
one month for occupational defendants, and six years and eight
months for organizational defendants. Legislative judgment and judicial action, as well as actual defendant behavior, thus give strong
evidence that organizational offenses are more menacing than occupational or individual crimes.
C.

The Nature ef the .Defendants

Since organizational offenders commit offenses of greater duration, sophistication, magnitude, and perceived seriousness, one
might imagine that they are to white-collar crime what the professional criminal is to blue-collar crime: namely, persons who have
specialized in crime as a way of life. If so, we might expect to find
that they have longer prior criminal records, and that they come
from more deprived social backgrounds than the other defendants in
our sample. Precisely the opposite is true. Because this Article seeks
primarily to describe differences in the nature of the offense and its
consequences, we will not examine in detail the disparities in defendants' social and criminal backgrounds. A summary portrait, however, includes the following main features:
(1) Organizational offenders are far less likely than their individual counterparts to have prior criminal records. The individual
defendants had· on average 3.4 prior arrests; the organizational offenders averaged slightly more than one half of one arrest, with the
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occupational offenders in between, but much closer to the organizational defendants.
(2) When organizational defendants did have prior records,
their most serious prior convictions were much less important than
those of individual defendants.39
{3) Although the average educational level for the total sample
was quite high, it was about two years higher for organizational defendants than for individual ones, with occupational offenders precisely in between. (The mean years of education were: individuals,
12.2; occupational defendants, 13.2; organizational defendants, 14.0).
(4) Organizational defendants were significantly older, averaging forty-seven years for the total sample, as compared to forty years
for the individual defendants. 40
(5) On two different but related measures of social status, one
reflecting occupational status, and the other the exemplary character
or "impeccability" of the defendant's prior conduct, organizational
defendants were again better positioned than their individual counterparts. They occupied higher positions when judged against standard occupational prestige ratings, and their prior conduct and
community reputation looked much more "impeccable" than those
of individual offenders. 41 On both measures, defendants who used
occupation fell between individual and organizational defendants,
though they were far closer to the latter.
(6) Perhaps because of the traits just described, probation officers were more likely to give a positive characterization of the community reputations of organizational offenders in PSis, than to so
characterize the reputations of occupational or individual offenders.
Such representations were made for fewer than ten percent of the
individual defendants and fifteen percent of the occupational defendants, but appeared in the reports of twenty-three percent of the
organizational defendants.
All of this suggests, then, that a portion of the organizational defendant's advantage accrues not through his organizational affiliation per se, but because the defendants' stature lends credibility to
their claims. Occupational and organizational status tend to go to39. The coding scheme for most serious prior convictions was based upon New York's
Penal Code, with minor additions for various federal offenses. There is a grading of offenses
from misdemeanors through low, moderate and high felonies.
40. Here again there are offense-specific results. Because tax offenders tend to be older
than embezzlers, our "occupational" category had a lower mean age (35) than the individual
category when we examined the total sample. In the restricted sample, the numbers fell neatly
into place: an average of36 years for individual defendants, 41 years for occupational defendants, and 44 years for organizational criminals.
41. See note 31, supra.
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gether in our society - the stockbroker, for example; is also vicepresident of the firm and the lawyer is also general counsel to the
corporation. This combination of organizational status and occupational position facilitates the theft of vastly greater sums of money
than in the case of almost any other kind of crime, white-collar or
not. Perhaps it is precisely the honorific status that we associate with
the higher positions in social life - a reward for achievement and
upstanding conduct - that enables the few in such positions who
commit more serious crimes to gain so greatly from them.

D. Sanctions and Legal Processing
In a related paper on the sentencing of white-collar offenders, we
note that the first and most important decision a sentencing judge
makes is whether the defendant will be imprisoned.42 We attempt
here to trace the major correlates of that decision. Act-related variables such as dollar victimization, sophistication, geographic spread,
and seriousness of the offense, as measured by maximum exposure to
imprisonment, are significantly related to the decision to incarcerate.
So are a number of actor-related variables: the social status of the
defendant, as measured by Duncan socioeconomic index scores (a
positive relationship), our measure of impeccability (the more impeccable, the less likely is incarceration), the number of previous arrests, and the most serious prior conviction. In addition, some of the
variation in incarceration can be explained by the statutory offense
category itself, by the district of conviction, and most important, by
the sex of the defendant (women are much less likely to be imprisoned than men).
These various factors do not permit clear prediction of sentencing patterns for organizational versus individual and occupational
offenders. On the one hand, the greater magnitude and sophistication of organizational offenders' crimes and their concomitant higher
act-related variable scores should point to a greater rate of incarceration. But organizational offenders' actor-related variable scores, especially those relating to impeccability and prior criminal history,
are lower than those of individual or occupational offenders, suggesting that they will be put behind bars less frequently. So perhaps
it is not surprising to find that differences in the rate of incarceration
among the categories of offenders were miniscule, especially between
organizational and individual defendants. Forty-eight percent of the
42. See Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and
Reality, forthcoming in theAmerican Sociological Review, for a fuller description. (on file with
the Michigan Law Review).
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individual defendants, thirty-eight percent of the occupational defendants, and forty-six percent of the organizational defendants
served some time in jail or prison. It would thus appear that the
greater severity of organizational defendants' crimes was offset at
time of sentencing by a more upright record of prior conduct. This
interpretation receives added support when it is recognized that the
probation officer's evaluative assessments, as reported in the PSI,
gave an edge to those defendants who could boast occupational or
organizational affiliation. It is also consistent with another relevant
fact: organizational defendants were about four times as likely to
have a supporting letter in their file from som~one in the community.
Finally, while only two thirds of the individual defendants enjoyed
private counsel, over ninety percent of the organizational defendants
were so represented. Privately retained lawyers may be more effective in keeping their clients from behind bars than appointed
counsel.
For organizational defendants who were imprisoned, however,
the greater severity of their crimes had an impact. Among all incarcerated offenders, the average length of sentence for the individual
defendants was nearly fifteen months. It was about the same fourteen and a half months - for occupational defendants, but was
twenty-four and a half months for organizational criminals.43 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that defendants who used an organizational "cover'' were given short, merely symbolic prison sentences.
III.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The bulk of this Article has tried to establish that persons who
commit offenses under the aegis of an organization are able thereby
to commit crimes of greater sophistication, complexity, and magnitude. In the remainder of this Article, we will speculate on what it is
about the organizational form that produces such differences in take,
and also consider possible social policy consequences that might flow
from this way of looking at white-collar crime.
But before dealing with various substantive interpretations, we
must consider the possibility that the main results are, in effect, an
artifact of law enforcement procedures. The organizational offenses
43. The 14½ month figure for occupational defendants does not include one fellow who
was committed to the custody of the Attorney-General for observation and study pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 4208b (now§ 4205c), which requires that the maximum sentence of imprisonment
prescribed by law be imposed, at least temporarily, until a study providing "more detailed
information as a basis for determining the sentence" is obtained. That defendant was given 17
consecutive five-year sentences; the sentencing project never learned whether the 85-year term
was later reduced.
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in our sample, it could be argued, are of large magnitude because
those are the ones it pays to detect and prosecute. If organization
provides effective cover for offenses, then only the largest will warrant the heavy investigative and prosecutorial resources that it takes
to get convictions. We would then be comparing a more representative sample of individual offenses with a very special sample of organizational ones, and much of the difference in magnitude reported
above would be explained by this fact. This explanation is consistent
with "labeling theory" in sociology, and with some of the known
facts about complex white-collar illegality.
Though the argument cannot be dismissed, it really cuts both
ways. If organizational crimes are more complicated, more difficult
to ferret out and prove, then the more complex and problematic they
become, the less likely it should be that they will come to the attention of enforcement personnel, be thoroughly investigated, or be
prosecuted to successful conclusion after indictment. Our results
may therefore underestimate differences between organizational and
other kinds of white-collar crime. The simple fact is that we really
don't know, in the case of common crime, simple white-collar crime,
or complex white-collar crime what the relationship is between the
magnitude of the take and the likelihood of getting caught. We see
no reason in principle for that relationship to differ greatly across
types of crime, and we rather imagine that in both simpler and more
complex offenses law enforcement officials must trade off their estimated likelihood of a conviction against the magnitude of the take.
The same felt need to maintain a winning record, to favor cases that
will conclude expeditiously with negotiated pleas of guilt, will obtain
regardless of the form illegality takes. In any event, even though
there may be some diminution of effect if the "enforcement artifact"
argument is valid, we doubt very much that it would entirely wash
away differences of the magnitude reported earlier in this Article.
We thus feel the findings still warrant interpretation.
Perhaps it is simply a question of scale. Just as famed heist-man
Willy Sutton robbed banks because "that's where the money is," our
defendants might use the organizational form because it yields large
sums. Business organizations operate on a grander scale than individuals. The management of a chain of supermarkets, for example,
will be perceived as having a legitimate need for larger bank loans
than a mom and pop grocery store. Similarly, while there is a plausible upper limit to the number of Medicaid claims that a doctor practicing individually can possibly handle, when claims are submitted
in the name of a clinic, it is harder to determine what that upper
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limit might be. Scale also means broader geographic reach. An organization can sell its dry oil wells in many different cities at once; a
lone con-man can concentrate on only a relatively few victims at a
single time. Just as economies of scale permit a big organization to
pro.fit legitimately from its size, so other attributes of scale facilitate
the commission of large-scale illegalities.
We imagine that a phenomenological feature operates here; too
- persons view organizations as more substantial, more solid, more
secure than individuals, and thus they may be less attentive to the
risks of being duped or done-in. 44 Even when this greater reservoir
of faith in the organization does not exist a priori, the fine art of
impression management may serve the organization equally well. A
firm's offices may be decorated with the accouterments of success plush carpeting, large desks, and fine antiques - even though the
company's product is virtually worthless. Symbols of success need
not be physical. We learned of one instance in which a corrupt organization was able to delay its downfall by visibly playing up its use
of a major investment banking firm. The organization must be all
right, the public was led to perceive, if a leading firm was negotiating
its bank loans. All the more so when, as in our other cases, the individuals acting on behalf of the organization are likely to present exemplary backgrounds.
In short, the organizational form itself, and public perceptions
warped by image-making, combine to give the organization a heightened sense of legitimacy. This legitimacy attaches, we believe,
whether the organization is designed, as in so many of our cases, to
receive money from commercial enterprises or federal funding
sources in response to false submissions, or whether it seeks to induce private individuals and other organizations to invest in or buy
products at inflated prices.· Just as the organizational form has facilitated economic and technological development on a scale far beyond
that achieved by individuals, so that form has permitted illegal gains
of a magnitude that men and women acting alone would find hard to
attam.
Even if the organizational form does not protect against getting
caught, it may so delay the process that the magnitude of offense
continues to grow. We have the strong impression that the professional norms that protect lawyer-client confidences also protect relationships among those of accountants, investment banking firms and
44. Indeed, one might guess that the corporate form, in particular, has become so familiar
a way of doing business that its absence might be some sort of warning sign. The advantages
of incorporation are so obvious that one who proceeds without them might be thought igno•
rant or foolish - not a good bet for a loan, investment, or as a business collaborator.
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others involved in large financial transactions, and are thus likely to
delay if not entirely inhibit the reporting of wrongdoing. The same
features that give organizations initial credibility with individuals
shield them from overly hasty complaint or investigation. Concerted
ignorance on the part of original offenders may be matched by that
among those professionals most likely to be drawn close to the activity in question. 45
If all these advantages accrue to the individual who uses the organizational form for illegal gain, why isn't there even more crime
committed with the organization as weapon? Part of the explanation
is that large pro.fits may be made through legitimate organizational
activity. For whatever advantages organization provides, it remains
the case that illegal behavior is found more often in newer, 46
smaller,47 less profitable48 organizations on the margins of more central business networks.49 In part for this reason, we doubt the capacity of increased penalties alone to have much influence on the kind
of behavior we are studying. Some defendants, to be sure, act on the
basis of a carefully weighed cost-benefit analysis. Others see no alternative to a desperate financial situation, and many doubt that they
will be caught.
This leads us to believe that more thought should be given to
alternative mechanisms of control. Is it possible, for example, to develop better warning signs that would indicate when a company is in
financial trouble and, therefore, more likely to adopt illegal solutions
to its problems? Given the power of the organizational form, should
we create more windows into the organization so that outsiders can
see more clearly what insiders are doing? Can we make better use. of
the accountants and lawyers whose presence lends legitimacy to organizational conduct? Maybe we can predict under what circumstances organizations will be more likely to violate the law. Perhaps
more sophisticated indicators can be developed, allowing regulatory
and other enforcement workers to focus all-too-limited investigative
45. On the social construction of cover-up, see Katz, Concerted Ignorance, 8 URBAN ,LIFE
295 (1979).
46. S. Shapiro, Detecting Illegalities: A Perspective on the Control of Securities Violations
(1980) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, Yale University); and P.
Yeager, The Politics of Corporate Social Control: The Federal Response to Industrial Water
Pollution (1981) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of
Wisconsin).
47. S. Shapiro, supra note 46.
48. Staw and Szwajkowski, The Scarcity-Munfjicence Component of Organizational Environments and the Commission of Illegal Acts, 20 Ao. SCI. Q. 345 (1975); M. CLINARD & P.
YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980).
49. Kriesberg, National Security and Conduct in the Steel Industry, 34 Soc. FORCES 268
(1956).
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resources in areas where they will be most effective. The IRS audits
tax returns, individual and corporate, with a relatively refined sense
of the chances of finding attempted evasion. Can agencies charged
with the control of organizational wrongdoing accomplish the same
thing when they review reports of compliance with environmental
pollution permits, offering statements, and the like?
Before new control strategies are investigated, time might well be
spent considering the impact of regulation on organizational illegality. Although crimes of great magnitude can continue month after
month, often accompanied by missed opportunities for detection, we
cannot estimate the net effects of changed rules or administrative
procedures. Perhaps we now have the "right" amount of crime committed via the organizational form, in the sense that any further surveillance or control efforts might reduce organizations' capacity to
grow and respond to new opportunities. The dollars that would go
into internal management or external control might be better spent
on other activities. The sheer magnitude, however, of the losses
caused by organizational misbehavior is enough to suggest the
contrary.
We began with an announced concern for the effect of occupation and organization on white-collar criminal activity. We have
shown that although a criminal acting in an occupational role does
enhance his "take," it is the combination of occupation and organization that yields the greatest payoffs. Occupation and organization
are to the world of white-collar crime what the knife and gun are to
street crimes. And just as we now have research that explores the
consequences of different types of weapons for common crime, so
may we anticipate a more detailed examination of the use of the
organizational form in w~te-collar illegality. The areas for research
are fertile. What are the most crucial features of organization for the
commission of specific white-collar offenses? Can we develop the
organizational equivalent of the ballistics unit for common crime to
identify readily features that link characteristic attributes of organizational style to particular offenses? These and related questions are
prompted by viewing the organization as the white-collar criminal's
most powerful weapon.

